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In response to the problem of landmines around the world, the United
States has created a Demining 2010 Initiative that is "a U.S.led initiative
to develop, marshal and commit the resources" to end the landmine
threat to civilians by the year 2010 [1]. One aspect of this initiative is the
Demining 2010 Initiative Conference, to be held in the summer of 1998.
This conference offers an opportunity to standardize data collection
methods to more accurately assess the landmine problem.
Most initial estimates concentrated on the number of landmines in
affected countries and the costs for removing each landmine. Two recent
publications have raised concerns about the value of these estimates for
considering the problem as it is today. In the Summer 1997 edition of this
journal, Peter Hager interviewed Colonel Lawrence Machabee, USMC,
who was one of the central figures in the development of the U.S. State
Department publication Hidden Killers [2,3]. Hidden Killers is often
cited as one of the authoritative sources for landmine numbers data, yet
Colonel Machabee expressed reservations about the validity of this 1994
data for estimates in 1997. In addition, in a February 1998 Washington
Post "Outlook" article, Laurie Boulden questioned what she termed
"official" statistics on landmine numbers saying that professional
deminers had told her that "the 'official' numbers vastly overstate what
they [the deminers] have found" [4].
Even if we could accurately estimate mine numbers, it would be difficult
to accept them as effective measures for two reasons. First, landmines
are not the only problem. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) is at least as
dangerous as landmines. In addition, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and various other harmful leftovers of military conflict pollute the
landscape of many former war zones. All of the leftovers from a conflict
that deminers face–landmines, UXOs, IEDs–should be measured.
Second, estimating the numbers is not an effective measure of the
resources required to implement a solution. Contaminated areas may be
more or less densely populated with explosives, but that information is
insignificant to a deminer. For example, if a 100 square meter field is
presumed to contain explosive devices, the number of explosives is
irrelevant. Whether it contains 50 devices or 100 devices, the entire field
needs to be surveyed with the same care.

Instead, discussions of the problem should center on the area of land
contaminated and the cost and time required to clear the area. By and
large, demining organizations already make their own estimates based on
land area. Efforts already are underway in most polluted countries to
survey the number of contaminated square meters of land and could
provide a more realistic estimate of the magnitude of the problem. In
addition, estimating the cost for clearance by square meter would give a
far more accurate description of the cost and likely duration of clean up.
These estimates are not easy to produce, nor are they uniform across
countries. For example, professional deminers are skeptical of estimating
the size of minefields because it demands extensive and, thus, expensive
surveying. They say that simply demining the field without estimating its
size is more cost effective. Additionally, they point out that cost and time
per square meter for clearance vary with the type of land. Sand,
farmland, rice paddies, and brush all are demined with different levels of
difficulty and require different amounts of money and time.
However, estimating the problem according to land area holds promise
for two important benefits. The first benefit of this method is prioritizing
critical areas for demining, such as roadways, wells, voting areas,
bridges, etc. By compelling removal of the landmine obstacles from
these critical areas first and demarcating the remaining contaminated
land, such prioritization would allow a quick return to more normal daily
conditions for local populations. The second benefit is changing our
perception of the landmine problem from impossible to approachable.
For example, it has been estimated that at the end of 1995 there were 488
square kilometers of contaminated area in Afghanistan [5]. During that
year, the United Nations mine clearance program for Afghanistan spent
US$25,050,000 and cleared 44 square kilometers of land [6]. According
to these figures, if funding levels were maintained, the problem in
Afghanistan could be resolved in about ten years. While Afghanistan
contains more areas to be surveyed and, therefore, the size of the
contaminated area is likely to grow, an estimate such as this is far more
promising than estimates based on numbers of mines. This method
would make demining an approachable issue rather than a process that
could take "more than a millennium" [7].
In short, the demining community needs to establish a common data
collection method based on land area. An effective, agreedupon, and
widely used method of measurement and data gathering would move the
entire field closer to a resolving the landmine problem by providing more
accurate estimates of the problem. Because one purpose of the Demining
2010 Initiative Conference is to "develop ways to improve the
international exchange of and access to demining information," I
recommend that the conference include specific agenda activities
designed to establish a consensus on data collection methods and publish
a schema of definitions based on the results [8].
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